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The Ghost of Glasswing: A Unified Theory of the November Shitshow

20 hours ago
18 min read

Updated: 19 hours ago

A fuzzy white plush bear mascot with glowing red eyes and a smirk stands raising one arm in a dark room lit by red and blue light, with abstract data patterns and smoke behind it

There comes a point when you've spent enough time looking at seemingly unrelated events that you begin to resemble that Matthew McConaughey cigarette meme. You know the one.


The progressively more horrified expression, accompanied by an increasingly unreasonable number of cigarettes. I've been approaching that point all week.


Air traffic grounded nationwide. Banking systems experiencing disruptions. Microsoft services having problems. United Airlines dealing with its own outage. Even the National Security Agency experiencing trouble with its classified internal communications network.


Meanwhile, we're getting warnings about increasingly sophisticated AI-powered cyberattacks, newly discovered vulnerabilities, and the urgent need to patch practically everything connected to the internet.

Naturally, the internet has responded with the usual selection of explanations. China did it. Russia did it. Iran did it. Superintelligence has escaped and is systematically dismantling Western civilization.


Or perhaps it's all just a coincidence. I don't think we need any of those explanations to arrive at something potentially more interesting.


What if these events aren't connected by an attacker, but by something that happened months earlier?


What if we're seeing the operational exhaust of the first major wave of AI-assisted vulnerability discovery and remediation? What if we're being haunted by the Ghost of Glasswing? And what if the November shitshow is, at least in part, the cybersecurity equivalent of AI slop?


Let's unpack that.


Remember When the Entire Internet Turned Into Studio Ghibli?

In March 2025, OpenAI introduced native image generation in GPT-4o.

Suddenly, everyone discovered that they could turn themselves, their pets, their families, and practically anything else into a Studio Ghibli-style illustration. For weeks, social media looked like someone had accidentally connected the entire planet to the same animation studio.


Then came other trends.


Dramatic black-and-white portraits. High-contrast photographs. People standing against walls decorated with AI-generated graffiti describing their accomplishments. Elaborate professional headshots. Everyone looking like they had just been photographed for the cover of a magazine nobody actually publishes.


And we all recognized the pattern.


A new capability became available. A large number of people began experimenting with it simultaneously. Most were learning through trial and error, copying the same prompts, and producing variations of the same thing. We could literally see the adoption wave. We even developed a name for much of the resulting content.


AI slop.


Not because the underlying technology was useless. Quite the opposite. The technology was extraordinary. But extraordinary tools don't automatically produce extraordinary work. They produce whatever the people using them are capable of producing. And when millions of people suddenly get access to something they barely understand, the first wave tends to be a fascinating mixture of innovation, experimentation, questionable decisions, and absolute garbage.


Now consider what happens when the new capability isn't an image generator. What happens when it's a system capable of identifying thousands of critical software vulnerabilities? And the people experimenting with it aren't generating cartoon portraits.


They're responsible for keeping the world's infrastructure operational.


Enter Project Glasswing

On April 7, 2026, Anthropic announced Project Glasswing and introduced Claude Mythos Preview.


The premise was remarkable.


Anthropic had developed an AI model with extraordinary cybersecurity capabilities, including the ability to discover and potentially exploit vulnerabilities in major software platforms. Rather than broadly releasing the model, Anthropic made it available through a restricted initiative involving major technology and infrastructure organizations.

The founding participants were Amazon Web Services, Anthropic, Apple, Broadcom, Cisco, CrowdStrike, Google, JPMorganChase, the Linux Foundation, Microsoft, NVIDIA, and Palo Alto Networks. The program has since grown to roughly 50 partners.


The mission was straightforward: find serious vulnerabilities and fix them before adversaries could exploit them.


A perfectly reasonable objective.


Then the numbers started coming in. By May 22, Anthropic reported that Glasswing participants had used Mythos Preview to find more than 10,000 high- or critical-severity vulnerabilities across the most systemically important software in the world. By October, the company reported that partners had uncovered at least 129,000 verified software vulnerabilities between April and July 2026, with its own open-source scanning adding another 5,500 between April and October. More than 33,000 of the verified findings had been rated high or critical.


Those are enormous numbers, although they represent findings across different organizations and projects, not 129,000 independent emergencies requiring immediate production changes.


Anthropic also says the figure is an undercount, drawn from survey data covering only a subset of partners, and estimates the true impact is at least five times higher. But the most revealing detail wasn't the number of vulnerabilities. It was something Anthropic acknowledged almost immediately.


The bottleneck had changed.


Previously, cybersecurity was constrained partly by how quickly researchers could discover vulnerabilities. Now organizations were struggling with how quickly they could verify, prioritize, disclose, and actually fix them. Anthropic's May update was explicit. Maintainers were "facing a deluge of low-quality, AI-generated bug reports," several were "severely capacity constrained," and some had "asked us to slow down our rate of our disclosures because they need more time to design patches." The company noted that a high- or critical-severity bug found by Mythos Preview takes two weeks to patch, on average.


By October the constraint was internal too. Anthropic said it had found more than 29,000 candidate vulnerabilities but had manually reviewed only about 6,000, and that it remained "bottlenecked on our human capacity to validate these findings." It had already sent nearly 5,000 unverified reports to maintainers who asked for everything in bulk.


Think about that.


We had developed tools capable of discovering security problems faster than the organizations responsible for fixing those problems could process them. We had accelerated the discovery of necessary work without necessarily accelerating our ability to complete that work safely.


And that is where my theory begins.


The First Generation of AI Security Slop

We've already watched this phenomenon unfold in software development.

Vibe coding. Give somebody an AI coding assistant, a reasonably detailed prompt, and a few hours, and they can produce something that looks astonishingly close to a finished application.


It has a beautiful interface. The buttons work. There's a database. Authentication appears functional. It might even have a dashboard.

The creator is delighted. Look what I built! Then somebody deploys it into a real production environment. Real users show up. Unexpected input appears. Authentication edge cases emerge. Dependencies fail. Performance collapses. Security vulnerabilities become apparent. And suddenly we're discovering the difference between generating a functioning demonstration and engineering a production-ready system.


An entire industry has emerged around auditing, securing, and rebuilding AI-generated applications. Why should we assume the first large-scale wave of AI-assisted cybersecurity would be immune to an analogous problem?


To be clear, finding vulnerabilities with AI isn't the same as having AI write and deploy fixes. An AI-generated vulnerability report can lead to a perfectly sound human-developed patch. Conversely, a human-written patch can introduce a spectacular failure. The relevant problem isn't necessarily who wrote the code. It's what happens when an unprecedented volume of new information suddenly forces organizations to change systems faster than their operational processes can comfortably absorb.


Imagine the situation inside a large enterprise.


Your security team has discovered vulnerabilities that nobody previously knew existed. Some are critical. Some are probably exploitable. Some affect software buried deep inside dependencies that haven't been examined in years. Management wants them fixed. Regulators may demand action. Vendors are issuing updates. Meanwhile, adversaries are increasingly using similar AI capabilities to find weaknesses themselves.


The pressure is obvious.


Patch it. Upgrade it. Replace it. Reconfigure it. Fix it before somebody gets in. And here's the problem.


Production infrastructure doesn't care how urgent your security initiative is.


It only cares whether the changes you introduce are compatible with everything else it depends on. Sometimes they aren't.


Anyone Who Has Ever Broken a Corporate Network Knows Where This Is Going

Years ago, I configured my first Cisco switch. And promptly took down an enterprise network with more than 300 nodes. Not intentionally, obviously.

I was learning. Something about the configuration wasn't right, and the consequences propagated farther than I anticipated.


Welcome to enterprise IT.


Anyone who has spent meaningful time administering networks, merging corporate environments, replacing infrastructure, or recovering from ransomware incidents knows exactly what I'm talking about.


You change one thing. Something else stops working.


You fix that.


Now something over here isn't communicating. You discover an undocumented dependency that apparently hasn't been touched since the Bush administration. Three hours later, you're sitting on the floor of a server room wondering whether there's a career opportunity in landscaping.


This isn't new. What is new is the potential velocity and scale.


When security teams are receiving thousands of new findings, deploying new software, migrating dependencies, and responding to rapidly changing threat intelligence, the number of opportunities for something to go wrong increases.


Sometimes the failure happens immediately.

Sometimes the change works perfectly until the next reboot.

Sometimes it sits quietly for months until an unrelated event triggers a condition nobody anticipated.


This is why mature IT organizations have change-control procedures, maintenance windows, staging environments, rollback plans, and people whose primary responsibility is preventing enthusiastic engineers from destroying the business.


Those procedures exist for a reason. And if you want a historical illustration of what happens when a legitimate security change goes catastrophically wrong, we already have one.


Remember CrowdStrike?

On July 19, 2024, CrowdStrike distributed a defective security-content configuration update that caused widespread Windows system crashes.


Airlines, hospitals, businesses, and government organizations experienced major disruptions. It wasn't a cyberattack. And it wasn't an AI-generated patch gone rogue. It was a legitimate security update that contained a defect its validation process failed to catch.


One update. Shared across an enormous installed base. Global consequences.


CrowdStrike's subsequent root-cause analysis identified a mismatch between expected and supplied inputs, leading to an out-of-bounds memory read. The important lesson wasn't that security updates are inherently dangerous. It was that a security system designed to protect infrastructure can become a mechanism for disrupting that infrastructure when a defective change propagates widely enough.


Now imagine a world where the number of urgent security changes increases dramatically because AI can identify vulnerabilities at previously unimaginable speed. You don't need rogue superintelligence. You don't even need malicious intent. You need an increasingly complex technology stack, a lot of changes, and an imperfect validation process.


We've already demonstrated what that combination can accomplish.


And Then Came November

Here is where things become particularly interesting.


Between November 13 and November 17, 2026, several major infrastructure and technology incidents occurred within days of one another.


On November 13, the Federal Aviation Administration issued a nationwide ground stop after instability spread through its telecommunications infrastructure. According to the FAA, its legacy network was receiving approximately 1,000 connection attempts every four to five seconds, disrupting communications and radar feeds. Instability affected 17 of the agency's 22 air route traffic control centers.


Investigators identified potential sources in Texas and Arkansas, including an Arkansas facility where contractor L3Harris was installing a new router as part of ongoing equipment replacement. The FAA says there is no evidence of a cyberattack. And there's an important qualification here: this was a long-running copper-to-fiber modernization effort, not a publicly identified Glasswing-related emergency patch. Its existence predates the Mythos rollout. But the operational failure is instructive.


The FAA explained that maintenance at remote facilities had routinely been performed during daytime hours because the work wasn't expected to affect national operations.


Except this time it did. One seemingly localized change produced consequences far beyond its anticipated scope. That is precisely the sort of failure enterprise IT administrators spend their careers trying to prevent. And it raises a perfectly reasonable question: how thoroughly had the potential blast radius been understood?


Then, on November 16, JPMorganChase experienced a technical problem that disrupted transactions and services. Customers of other financial institutions also reported problems, creating the appearance of simultaneous failures across several banks. Subsequent reporting clarified that at least some of those problems reflected transactions involving Chase rather than independent failures at every institution.


Chase attributed its problem to a software bug involving an on-premises hardware system, not a cyberattack.


Again, no established Glasswing connection. But it demonstrated another familiar principle: one institution's failure can create symptoms across a wider network of dependent services.


And then, on November 17, something happened that provided a much more direct connection to the cybersecurity remediation story.


The NSA experienced disruption to NSANet, its classified internal communications network. The agency described the incident as temporary degradation during scheduled maintenance and said mission-critical capabilities remained operational. Further reporting connected the disruption to urgent patching of vulnerabilities in PHP, the widely used programming language.


The NSA had issued an advisory on October 21 warning of serious PHP vulnerabilities, collectively referred to as PHP2Shell, and urging organizations to deploy fixes.


Then the Director of National Intelligence said it out loud.


Speaking on Fox Business, Jay Clayton described the sequence directly: "If you go back about 10 days ago, we had what was labeled as PHP, an update to a web interface system. And the patching that has gone on following that has caused some of these systems to not come back up when you patch them as expected. That is what has happened at the NSA today."


Now we have an actual causal chain, described by the government's own intelligence chief. A serious security vulnerability was discovered. The government warned organizations to patch it. Security updates were implemented. Some systems failed during the process.


That doesn't establish that Mythos discovered the underlying PHP vulnerabilities. Nor does it prove that an AI agent wrote the problematic fixes. But it does demonstrate the mechanism we're discussing.


A legitimate attempt to make critical infrastructure more secure directly contributed to an operational failure.


And that's very different from an external attacker taking the system offline.


The Ghost in the Change Log

Here's the hypothesis.


What if the events we're observing don't necessarily have a common technical root cause? What if some of them share a common organizational cause?


In April, an extraordinary new capability became available to select organizations. Over the following months, thousands of vulnerabilities were discovered, validated, and reported. Businesses and government agencies began addressing an expanding backlog of security problems.

Patches were developed. Dependencies were upgraded. Configurations were changed. Infrastructure was modified. And perhaps some of those changes introduced weaknesses, incompatibilities, or delayed operational problems that nobody recognized at the time.


The failures wouldn't necessarily appear immediately.


One might emerge during a restart. Another during a scheduled maintenance cycle. Another when network traffic changed. Another when a previously dormant dependency was activated. Another when an update conflicted with something deployed months earlier.


If multiple organizations reacted to the same discovery wave, security advisories, and vendor release schedules, their downstream problems could become temporally clustered even though the actual technical failures were unrelated. That is what makes the idea interesting.


The common event wouldn't be the outage. It would be the earlier wave of decisions that ultimately preceded the outages.


The visible failures would be second-order consequences. The ghost of a technological event that happened months before. That's also why we need to be careful about the timeline. There is currently no evidence establishing that the November incidents were caused by patches deployed six months earlier, nor that they were all responding to the same vulnerability discoveries. Some clearly have different explanations.

The question is whether the broader incident population contains a measurable subset that fits this pattern. That can be investigated.


Meanwhile, the Other Side Has the Same Tools

There's another dimension to all this that makes the pressure considerably more understandable. The people discovering vulnerabilities aren't exclusively working for the good guys.


On November 16, Google's Threat Intelligence Group published findings describing the increasing use of autonomous, multi-agent frameworks by cybercriminal and espionage actors.


These systems can accelerate reconnaissance, vulnerability scanning, exploit development, and portions of the intrusion process. Some threat actors are moving beyond asking AI for assistance and toward connecting models to tools that can perform sequences of operations with less human intervention.


That's significant. But it isn't evidence that AI-powered attackers caused the November FAA, banking, or NSA incidents. It's evidence that the threat environment is changing. And that creates a feedback loop.


Attackers get better at finding weaknesses. Defenders accelerate vulnerability discovery. The resulting discoveries generate pressure to remediate. Remediation requires modifying complex infrastructure. Complex changes introduce operational risk. Meanwhile, attackers continue improving their capabilities, making organizations even less comfortable delaying security updates. It becomes an arms race with two obvious participants and a third that doesn't get nearly enough attention.


The attackers.

The defenders.

And the engineers responsible for keeping everything running while the first two accelerate.


That third group might ultimately determine whether the whole thing remains sustainable.


The Government's Explanation Isn't Necessarily Wrong. It May Just Be Incomplete.

One of the frustrating aspects of the November coverage has been the repeated assertion that there is no evidence of a coordinated cyberattack.


That may be entirely accurate.


In fact, the currently available evidence supports treating these incidents as separate failures unless something more concrete emerges. But the statement answers a narrower question than many people are actually asking.


Were these systems maliciously compromised as part of one coordinated campaign?


Apparently not, based on what investigators have disclosed. But why were so many organizations making consequential infrastructure changes during the same general period? What prompted those changes? Were they routine modernization initiatives? Were they responses to newly discovered vulnerabilities? Were they urgent because security teams believed exploitation was imminent? Did vendor updates introduce common regressions? Were some organizations deploying AI-generated fixes without adequate testing? And how many of the resulting changes created problems that would only become apparent later?


These are different questions. And the hypothesis isn't being invented from nothing.


On November 17, Senator Mark Warner, vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, described almost exactly this mechanism. AI, he said, is "making it possible to identify vulnerabilities across enormous numbers of systems at unprecedented speed, creating enormous pressure on companies and government agencies to patch those vulnerabilities immediately, often all at once, putting tremendous strain on systems that weren't built to handle that pace of change."


He added that "the evidence so far points toward legitimate efforts to secure our systems, not malicious activity."


That is a senator with access to the classified briefing describing the same dynamic, while explicitly ruling out the attacker explanation. Reuters subsequently reported that cybersecurity experts were examining accelerated patching as a possible contributing factor behind some of the recent disruptions.


So we're not inventing the basic mechanism out of thin air. What remains unproven is the more specific proposition that Project Glasswing's initial rollout created a delayed, measurable wave of failures across critical infrastructure. And that's the distinction we need to preserve.


There's Already Evidence That the Discovery Pipeline Is Messy

Another aspect of this deserves attention, and it cuts against the alarmism in an interesting way.


Vulnerability intelligence firm VulnCheck has been tracking Anthropic's public Glasswing disclosure ledger since the program launched. Its November analysis counted 37,966 reported findings as of Anthropic's November 2 update. Of those, only 7,349, or 19.4 percent, had been made public.

And only 217 had been marked fixed. Meanwhile 1,654 findings had been marked as duplicates, roughly 7.5 times the number fixed, and another 419 had been withdrawn. Between VulnCheck's September and November snapshots, Anthropic added nearly 12,000 findings and recorded just 15 additional fixes.


Those figures shouldn't be confused with Anthropic's broader partner-reported discovery totals, and the ledger's fix statuses don't establish how many vulnerabilities were actually resolved across all participating organizations. But they do expose a practical problem. Finding vulnerabilities and getting useful, verified, actionable information into the hands of maintainers are two different things. And getting that information converted into tested production fixes is another process entirely.


VulnCheck found the same friction at the receiving end. The curl project, one of the most widely deployed pieces of software on the internet, rejected 19 of 34 reports published to it as not vulnerabilities, confirmed six as low severity, and left nine awaiting assessment.


An AI system can generate a vulnerability report in minutes. The responsible organization may need days, weeks, or months to reproduce the issue, assess its severity, develop a compatible fix, test the consequences, coordinate deployment, and ensure that nothing else breaks. Those processes aren't necessarily defective because they're slow. They're slow because reality is complicated. And an avalanche of new findings doesn't make that complexity disappear. It just gives everyone more of it to deal with.


The Number That Undercuts the Panic

There's one more VulnCheck figure that deserves its own paragraph, because it reframes the whole argument.


Of the 442 CVEs attributable to Anthropic that VulnCheck has tracked, two have been exploited in the wild. That's 0.45 percent. Roughly half a percent of all CVEs published in 2026 trace back to this program.


Sit with that for a second.


We generated tens of thousands of findings, applied enormous institutional pressure to remediate them immediately, and almost none of it has translated into demonstrated real-world exploitation.


I don't raise that to argue the work was worthless. Finding a vulnerability before an adversary does is the entire point, and absence of exploitation may be evidence the program worked. But it does mean the urgency driving the patching wave was manufactured largely by volume and fear, not by a measurable increase in attacks. Which is precisely the mechanism I'm describing.


The slop created the pressure. The pressure created the changes. And the changes are where things broke.


If the discoveries had been fewer, better validated, and more evenly distributed across time, would the remediation wave have been as concentrated?


Probably not.


That's the part worth investigating.


We Need to Start Looking at Three Different Clocks

If we want to investigate this theory seriously, tracking outage dates isn't enough. We need to track three events independently.


The discovery date. When was the underlying vulnerability identified, and by whom? Was it discovered through AI-assisted research, conventional testing, exploitation in the wild, or some combination?


The change date. When did the organization actually modify its infrastructure? What was deployed, upgraded, replaced, or reconfigured? What justification appeared in the change ticket?


The failure date. When did operational problems first appear, and what specific condition triggered them?


Those three dates may be separated by hours, weeks, or months.

And if this hypothesis holds, we might discover that incidents which appear unrelated when organized by failure date have meaningful relationships when organized by discovery date, vendor release, or remediation initiative.


We would also need to compare the findings with historical change rates and outage baselines. Otherwise, ordinary maintenance clustering could be mistaken for evidence of something new. The presence of a pattern isn't enough. The pattern has to survive comparison against what normally happens. And if it does, we could be looking at an entirely new operational risk category. Not malicious AI. Not runaway superintelligence.


Correlated infrastructure instability generated by AI-accelerated organizational behavior.


That's a mouthful, I know. But so is a fistful of cigarettes, and here we are.


The Real Lesson Isn't to Stop Patching Things

If there's an important lesson here, it's certainly not that organizations should abandon security updates or leave known vulnerabilities exposed.


That's how you eventually end up paying somebody in cryptocurrency to get your own files back. The lesson is that vulnerability discovery, remediation engineering, and production deployment can't be treated as interchangeable activities. Finding a problem doesn't mean you've safely solved it. Generating a fix doesn't mean you've validated it. And successfully deploying an update doesn't mean you've understood every dependency that might be affected by it. The traditional disciplines of enterprise IT still matter. Staged deployments. Representative testing. Dependency inventories. Change windows. Rollback capability. Recovery exercises. Human review of consequential modifications.


None of that becomes obsolete because a model can write code or identify vulnerabilities faster than a person. If anything, it becomes more important. AI can accelerate the work, but organizations also need to increase their capacity to validate and absorb that work safely. Otherwise, we're simply automating the production of changes faster than we can understand their consequences. And if those changes affect critical infrastructure, the cost of getting something wrong may be measured in grounded flights, interrupted financial transactions, disrupted hospitals, or unavailable government systems. That's a rather different risk profile from producing a cartoon portrait with six fingers.


So, Is Glasswing Responsible for the November Shitshow?

We don't know. And anyone claiming to have conclusively connected the entire cluster to Project Glasswing is getting ahead of the evidence.

Some November incidents have specific explanations that don't require Glasswing at all. The FAA has identified a network modernization and router-related problem. Chase has identified a software fault in its own environment. The NSA outage has a reported link to urgent security remediation, described on the record by the Director of National Intelligence, but no demonstrated connection to a Glasswing-generated patch. Other incidents still require their own technical investigations.


The broad chronology is suggestive, not dispositive. But that's precisely why the hypothesis deserves investigation rather than dismissal or premature acceptance. Because there's a broader phenomenon here that we can already observe. AI has dramatically increased the rate at which organizations can discover weaknesses. Attackers are using increasingly autonomous tools to exploit them. Defenders are responding under pressure.

And the infrastructure caught between them is often old, complicated, poorly documented, and much less forgiving than the promotional material would suggest.


We've seen what happens when millions of people simultaneously experiment with a new image generator. We've seen what happens when inexperienced developers discover they can generate entire applications with a prompt. We've seen what happens when a legitimate security update from one vendor propagates a defect across a huge installed base. Why would we assume that an unprecedented leap in cybersecurity capabilities couldn't produce its own first-generation operational mistakes?


The question isn't whether such mistakes are possible. We know they are.

The question is whether we're witnessing a particularly large, correlated wave of them. And if we are, how do we recognize it before the next wave arrives?


The Ghost of Glasswing

Here's the thought I keep coming back to.


We tend to imagine that major infrastructure disruptions require major initiating events. A sophisticated foreign adversary. A massive cyberattack. A coordinated campaign. Some extraordinary technological failure.


Sometimes they do.


But other times, extraordinary consequences emerge from entirely ordinary behavior repeated across enough interconnected systems.


A security researcher discovers something. An advisory gets published. A manager demands a fix. An engineer applies an update. A dependency changes. A service fails. Another system reacts. And somewhere, an exhausted administrator who thought he was doing a perfectly routine maintenance task discovers that half the country is having a very bad afternoon.


Nobody intended the outcome. Nobody necessarily coordinated the activity.

Nobody had to attack anything. Yet the resulting disruption can still be significant.


That possibility is what I find most compelling about the Ghost of Glasswing.


Maybe the ghost isn't an autonomous AI hiding inside our networks.

Maybe it's the accumulated consequences of thousands of perfectly understandable decisions made by organizations responding to the same sudden technological acceleration. Maybe we're not seeing AI directly breaking infrastructure. Maybe we're seeing the consequences of infrastructure being forced to change faster than the institutions responsible for it have learned to manage. And maybe the first truly consequential wave of AI slop won't be recognized by how ridiculous it looks. Maybe we'll recognize it by what stops working.


The irony would be extraordinary.


We developed incredibly powerful tools to discover everything wrong with our digital infrastructure. And in our rush to fix it, we may have discovered an entirely new way to break things.


That's the Ghost of Glasswing.


And until we examine the change logs, deployment histories, and remediation decisions behind these failures, we won't know how much of November it actually explains.


One final thought.

To everyone currently responsible for keeping critical systems operational: I sincerely hope your change-control procedures are better than your management's understanding of AI.

And for the love of God, test your rollbacks.

Because if this keeps up, the only people qualified to repair the damage are going to be locked in their rooms playing Grand Theft Auto 6.

And good luck getting them to answer the phone.



Sources and Further Reading

Project Glasswing and AI vulnerability discovery



*Editorial note: This article presents a hypothesis about possible shared organizational causes behind several infrastructure disruptions. It does not assert that Project Glasswing, AI-generated patches, or a coordinated adversarial campaign caused the November outages. The distinctions between confirmed incident findings, reported explanations, and speculative connections are intentional.*


Rich Washburn is a technologist, strategist, and Founder & Chief AI Architect of ARIA AI Labs, working at the intersection of AI, infrastructure, communications, and capital. He also serves as Managing Partner and Chief AI Officer at Eliakim Capital.

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© 2018 Rich Washburn

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